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Czemu nauka programowania z Blenderem jest łatwa
by spin＠hackerspace.pl 25 Nov '14

25 Nov '14

dlatemu. http://vimeo.com/103321600

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MozDef
by viq 23 Nov '14

23 Nov '14

The inspiration for MozDef comes from the large arsenal of tools available to attackers. Suites like metasploit, armitage, lair, dradis and others are readily available to help attackers coordinate, share intelligence and finely tune their attacks in real time. Defenders are usually limited to wikis, ticketing systems and manual tracking databases attached to the end of a Security Information Event Management (SIEM) system. The Mozilla Defense Platform (MozDef) seeks to automate the security incident handling process and facilitate the real-time activities of incident handlers. http://mozdef.readthedocs.org/en/latest/overview.html -- viq

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Klon arduino DIY
by Paweł Flis 22 Nov '14

22 Nov '14

Czesc, Poszukuje jakiegos sensownego projektu klona arduino z dostepnymi PCB etc (chce zlozyc to samemu). Aktualnie jedynym z ciekawszych projektow spotkalem tylko sunduino - jednak brak mi: - mozliwosci wgrywania firmware po USB - napiecia 3.3V. Tak, wiem ze moge pod niego podlaczyc sobie USB <> TTL i tak samo regulator 3.3V ale idac tym tropem to w rownie dobrze moge wrzucic procka na plytke stykowa i wgrac bootloader arduino - a to nie o to chodzi. Co chcialbym otrzymac: - klon arduino uno - programowanie, komunikacja i debug via USB - koniecznie wbudowane reg na 3.3V - plytke jednostronna (bo przy 2stronnej trace cierpliwosc i ze zlosci przypiekam sie zelazkiem) - fajnie gdyby montaz byl przewlekamy - ale SMD tez nie pogardze (ja! nie bedzie trzeba wiercic!) - jak by zamiast ftdi byl MCP2200 to bym wogole byl zajarany (mam akurat kilka tych mcp pod reka) any ideas?

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Tablet od Jolli
by Robert Partyka 20 Nov '14

20 Nov '14

https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/jolla-tablet-world-s-first-crowdsourced-… jakby ktoś nie widział. W tej cenie to całkiem niezła opcja. -- BoBsoN

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nowy wątek - lecę do chin
by Daj Nóż 19 Nov '14

19 Nov '14

elo Lecę do kitaju za kilka dni i potrzebuję dobrych rad o bezpiecznych internetach w chinach - plis help. sam nie wiem o co pytać... przydałby mi się jakiś tracker tak, żeby znajomi wiedzieli gdzie jestem. pozdro dzięki - piątka j

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Darmowe CA od Mozilli, EFF, Cisco, Akamai & more
by viq 19 Nov '14

19 Nov '14

https://letsencrypt.org/ -- viq

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Fwd: [SiaB Community] WhisperSystems partners with WhatsApp
by rysiek 18 Nov '14

18 Nov '14

WAT. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: [SiaB Community] WhisperSystems partners with WhatsApp Data: wtorek, 18 listopada 2014, 17:11:02 Od: dan From our "didn't see THAT coming" file... ...what Moxy Marlinspike is calling possibly the largest rollout of end-to-end encryption ever. Planned features to follow will include user verification. https://whispersystems.org/blog/whatsapp/ ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: [Dailydave] More info on SSLMAGEDON
by rysiek 17 Nov '14

17 Nov '14

Intredasting. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Fwd: [Dailydave] More info on SSLMAGEDON Data: poniedziałek, 17 listopada 2014, 10:06:11 Od: coderman Do: cpunks <cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Dave Aite Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 10:59:50 -0500 Subject: [Dailydave] More info on SSLMAGEDON Our friends at BeyondTrust have a page on the bug now: http://blog.beyondtrust.com/triggering-ms14-066 One thing I think people are missing is that this bug works by default on Windows 7 and above. You can force a client cert down Window's throat, which triggers the vulnerability regardless of configuration settings. Of course, what you do next, is the fun part. Immunity's researchers are investigating many techniques, one of which is to attack the crypto variables directly. This may allow a Heartbleed-or-worse style exploitation without code execution at all... ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: Doing HTTPS everywhere in the .gov space
by rysiek 16 Nov '14

16 Nov '14

Ciekawe rzeczy! ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Doing HTTPS everywhere in the .gov space Data: piątek, 14 listopada 2014, 11:13:41 Od: Eric Mill Do: cpunks <cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org> Hey, I wrote a piece today for my organization, 18F, about our HTTPS-everywhere policy for the .gov websites we build inside the US government: https://18f.gsa.gov/2014/11/13/why-we-use-https-in-every-gov-website-we-mak… I wanted to give this list some extra context, since I understand the US government is a big, complicated, freighted topic. Below is my *personal* attempt to describe my workplace and is not anything close to an official description or the voice of the government. 18F[1] is a team of ~70 people working as full time employees inside the US federal government. (The name comes from the street intersection -- 18th St & F St -- that its HQ is at in DC.) 18F as a unit was created around a year ago to be a competent, top class in-house technology team for the US federal government. A driving idea here is that the government shouldn't need to outsource its *entire* technical brain to contractors, and that government services can be simple and even beautiful. If you've noticed what's happened over the last few years in the UK at https://www.gov.uk by the Government Digital Service[2], 18F takes a lot of inspiration from them. 18F is housed inside the General Services Administration, an independent federal agency[3] that does as many different things as its name implies, from running all the buildings to housing the nation's data catalog at Data.gov. It's an "independent" federal agency in that it's not subject to the same level of direct executive and White House control that cabinet agencies are. It's the same kind of "independent" that lets the FCC potentially disagree with the President on net neutrality, for example. The team has people all over the country (it has a big SF office, for example), many of which have either never been in government before, or who came in after doing the Presidential Innovation Fellows[4] program. I joined 18F after working for 5 years on open data apps, infrastructure, and policy at the Sunlight Foundation[5], a non-profit in DC that pushes for open government. I had also done a fair amount of work around privacy, HTTPS, and ongoing judicial activity around surveillance. I get to continue doing all of that work in my personal capacity. I say this just to try to communicate that the 18F team has some very sincere people trying to make the US government work better for people all over the world, and to do right by technology in the process. We have substantial support and autonomy to make that happen. When it comes to HTTPS, the .gov surface area is absolutely enormous, and moving it helps move the whole Internet forward. Bringing the government in line with the rest of the web/security community (and being loud about it) is one of my big priorities at 18F, and so I wanted to share this here with you all. -- Eric [1] https://18f.gsa.gov/ [2] https://gds.blog.gov.uk/ [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_agencies_of_the_United_States_gov… [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidential_Innovation_Fellows [5] https://sunlightfoundation.com/ -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone> ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: [Cryptography] FW: IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality
by rysiek 16 Nov '14

16 Nov '14

SRSBSNS. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Please find this statement issued by the IAB today. On behalf of the IAB, Russ Housley IAB Chair = = = = = = = = = = = = = IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality In 1996, the IAB and IESG recognized that the growth of the Internet depended on users having confidence that the network would protect their private information. RFC 1984 documented this need. Since that time, we have seen evidence that the capabilities and activities of attackers are greater and more pervasive than previously known. The IAB now believes it is important for protocol designers, developers, and operators to make encryption the norm for Internet traffic. Encryption should be authenticated where possible, but even protocols providing confidentiality without authentication are useful in the face of pervasive surveillance as described in RFC 7258. Newly designed protocols should prefer encryption to cleartext operation. There may be exceptions to this default, but it is important to recognize that protocols do not operate in isolation. Information leaked by one protocol can be made part of a more substantial body of information by cross-correlation of traffic observation. There are protocols which may as a result require encryption on the Internet even when it would not be a requirement for that protocol operating in isolation. We recommend that encryption be deployed throughout the protocol stack since there is not a single place within the stack where all kinds of communication can be protected. The IAB urges protocol designers to design for confidential operation by default. We strongly encourage developers to include encryption in their implementations, and to make them encrypted by default. We similarly encourage network and service operators to deploy encryption where it is not yet deployed, and we urge firewall policy administrators to permit encrypted traffic. We believe that each of these changes will help restore the trust users must have in the Internet. We acknowledge that this will take time and trouble, though we believe recent successes in content delivery networks, messaging, and Internet application deployments demonstrate the feasibility of this migration. We also acknowledge that many network operations activities today, from traffic management and intrusion detection to spam prevention and policy enforcement, assume access to cleartext payload. For many of these activities there are no solutions yet, but the IAB will work with those affected to foster development of new approaches for these activities which allow us to move to an Internet where traffic is confidential by default. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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