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Fwd: get_key_info.sh on FinFisher for public key server
by rysiek 08 Aug '14

08 Aug '14

Lulz continues. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: get_key_info.sh on FinFisher for public key server Data: piątek, 8 sierpnia 2014, 12:47:50 Od: Nathan Andrew Fain Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org I have not checked all files, just a sample. as keys have not been revoked or removed from the public server it would help if someone could execute the following on every gpg'ed file. as individuals revoke their keys, if im not mistaken, we will not be able to document the names of those keys. [get_key_info.sh] #!/bin/bash FILE="$1" for ID in $(gpg -d "$FILE" |& awk '{print $7}' | grep -v 'available'); do #gpg --dry-run --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-keys 0x${ID} echo "ID: 0x$ID" w3m -dump "https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=0x${ID}&op=index" \ | grep pub done LOG: $ ./get_key_info.sh FinIPCatcher.zip.gpg ID: 0x977E9F54 ID: 0x0FC82479 ID: 0x0FEB4CFF ID: 0x6225EAA0 ID: 0x58143658 ID: 0x8E037629 ID: 0x8269976E pub 1024D/66878388 2013-04-17 Alfons Rauscher <alfons.rauscher(a)vervis.de> ID: 0xB03A5EA9 ID: 0xD81082F4 pub 2048R/D81082F4 2012-03-08 Melvin Teoh (Gamma Group) <mt(a)gammmagroup.com> ID: 0xF5946EA8 ID: 0x695D98C9 ID: 0x280AD26F ID: 0xF158ADF2 ID: 0xF166F2CA pub 2048R/3F895273 2013-03-05 Alexander Hagenah <ah(a)primepage.de> ID: 0x7774F144 ID: 0xA7A4AC21 pub 2048R/A7A4AC21 2013-03-05 Hari Purnama (pgp) <hp(a)gammagroup.com> $ ./get_key_info.sh FinIP-Catcher-User-Manual.docx.gpg ID: 0x977E9F54 ID: 0x0FC82479 ID: 0x0FEB4CFF ID: 0x6225EAA0 ID: 0x58143658 ID: 0x8E037629 ID: 0x8269976E pub 1024D/66878388 2013-04-17 Alfons Rauscher <alfons.rauscher(a)vervis.de> ID: 0xB03A5EA9 ID: 0xD81082F4 pub 2048R/D81082F4 2012-03-08 Melvin Teoh (Gamma Group) <mt(a)gammmagroup.com> ID: 0xF5946EA8 ID: 0x695D98C9 ID: 0x280AD26F ID: 0xF158ADF2 ID: 0xF166F2CA pub 2048R/3F895273 2013-03-05 Alexander Hagenah <ah(a)primepage.de> ID: 0x7774F144 ID: 0xA7A4AC21 pub 2048R/A7A4AC21 2013-03-05 Hari Purnama (pgp) <hp(a)gammagroup.com> $ ./get_key_info.sh FinFly-Web-Syllabus.pdf.gpg ID: 0x977E9F54 ID: 0x0FC82479 ID: 0x0FEB4CFF ID: 0x6225EAA0 ID: 0x58143658 ID: 0x8E037629 ID: 0x8269976E pub 1024D/66878388 2013-04-17 Alfons Rauscher <alfons.rauscher(a)vervis.de> ID: 0xB03A5EA9 ID: 0xD81082F4 pub 2048R/D81082F4 2012-03-08 Melvin Teoh (Gamma Group) <mt(a)gammmagroup.com> ID: 0xF5946EA8 ID: 0x695D98C9 ID: 0x280AD26F ID: 0xF158ADF2 ID: 0xF166F2CA pub 2048R/3F895273 2013-03-05 Alexander Hagenah <ah(a)primepage.de> ID: 0x7774F144 ID: 0xA7A4AC21 pub 2048R/A7A4AC21 2013-03-05 Hari Purnama (pgp) <hp(a)gammagroup.com> ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Wrocław, Poznań, Łódź, Gdańsk, śląsk
by spin＠hackerspace.pl 08 Aug '14

08 Aug '14

Joł, Mnóstwo osób z tych miast które się dopytywały o hackerspace na Woodstocku. Ja nie ogarniam, więc mówiłem im "coś tam jest lub się organizuje" i żeby szukali po netach. Wielki fail dla miast których nie było a kóre coś kręcą w tematach HSowych, mialibyście luźną ręką 2D6 członków każdy. Smutne trochę że nikt o Warszawę nie pytał prawie. Niech ktoś FWDnie tego maila po listach. To trochę tak po chuju że ja, który jest gościem od blendera i drukowania 3d musiałem opowiadać ludziom o tym jakie spejse są u nich w miastach. I to nie do końca było tak że nie mieliśmy gdzie mieszkać na stoisku, i nie do końca tak że nie było prysznicy i wejścia wszędzie na blachę NGO. W przyszłym roku mamy możliwość zorganizowania obozu hackerspaces na woodstocku, daliśmy zajebiście czadu. Greenpeace wstępnie deklarował prąd (6KW@peak power z solarów + li-ion bank na over9000Ah) więc możemy zacząć kilka dni przed Woodem. Przypominam że Berlin jest 70 km od Kostrzyna nad Odrą, byli ludzie z Berlińskich HSów i gadalismy z nimi, przynajmniej jeden z HSów berlińskich powiedział że wchodzi w to jak w mokry sernik z galaretką (parafrazuję z Angielskiego). Niechciałbym musieć koordynować międzi sobą wszystkich istniejących, powstających i niepowstałych HSów w PL, więc byłoby fajnie gdyby wieść się rozeszła tak by użyć tej listy jako głównej komunikacyjnej. Ramen. (tak, FSM ma swój episkopat na Woodzie :) )

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FinFisher do pobrania ;-)
by Paweł Zegartowski 06 Aug '14

06 Aug '14

Ogłasza się co następuje: http://www.reddit.com/r/Anarchism/comments/2cjlop/gamma_international_leake… Wnętrzności [ok 40 GB] https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/finfisher.torrent https://twitter.com/gammagrouppr https://github.com/FinFisher/FinFly-Web Taka sytuacja,

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Fwd: lowRISC -- fully open hardware systems
by rysiek 06 Aug '14

06 Aug '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: lowRISC -- fully open hardware systems Data: środa, 6 sierpnia 2014, 13:31:49 Od: Eugen Leitl Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org, 31337 <linux-elitists(a)zgp.org> http://www.lowrisc.org/ lowRISC Open to the core lowRISC is producing fully open hardware systems. From the processor core to the development board, our goal is to create a completely open computing eco- system. Our open-source SoC (System-on-a-Chip) designs will be based on the 64-bit RISC-V instruction set architecture. Volume silicon manufacture is planned as is a low-cost development board. lowRISC is a not-for-profit organisation working closely with the University of Cambridge and the open-source community. To keep track of the project, follow @lowRISC or join our announcements list by entering your email below: Submit The Team Robert Mullins - Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, co-founder of Raspberry Pi Gavin Ferris - Dreamworks, Radioscape (co-founder), Aspect Capital (former CIO) Alex Bradbury - Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge and Raspberry Pi Technical Advisory Board Krste Asanovic (UC Berkeley) Julius Baxter (OpenRISC) Bunnie Huang (Hacker) Michael Taylor (UCSD) Careers We are currently hiring. Two new positions are available at the Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. Contact us at info(a)lowrisc.org ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Don't mind me, I just drop links here
by Robert Gerus 05 Aug '14

05 Aug '14

http://www.onebigfluke.com/2014/08/from-plastic-3d-print-to-milled.html

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Fwd: [tor-talk] Tor-ramdisk 20140801 released
by rysiek 05 Aug '14

05 Aug '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- From: Anthony G. Basile Date: Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 8:25 AM Subject: [tor-talk] Tor-ramdisk 20140801 released Hi everyone I want to announce to the list that a new release of tor-ramdisk is out. Tor-ramdisk is an i686 or x86_64 uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose only purpose is to host a Tor server in an environment that maximizes security and privacy. Security is enhanced by hardening the kernel and binaries, and privacy is enhanced by forcing logging to be off at all levels so that even the Tor operator only has access to minimal information. Finally, since everything runs in ephemeral memory, no information survives a reboot, except for the Tor configuration file and the private RSA key, which may be exported/imported by FTP or SCP. Changelog: tor was updated to 0.2.4.23 which addresses CVE-2014-5117. The kernel was updated to 3.15.7+ Gentoo's hardened-patches-3.15.7-1.extras. All other packages are the same as the previous release. It is recommended that users upgrade immediately. For more information see https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2014-July/000094.html. i686: Homepage: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk Download: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk-downloads x86_64: Homepage: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-x86_64-ramdisk Download: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-x86_64-ramdisk-downloads -- Anthony G. Basile, Ph. D. Chair of Information Technology D'Youville College Buffalo, NY 14201 (716) 829-8197 ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Former NSA Director Keith Alexander is patenting techniques to protect computer networks
by rysiek 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

Hej, komentarz zbędny. "Former NSA Director Keith Alexander is patenting a variety of techniques to protect computer networks. We're supposed to believe that he developed these on his own time and they have nothing to do with the work he did at the NSA, except for the parts where they obviously did and therefore are worth $1 million per month for companies to license. No, nothing fishy here." -- https://joindiaspora.com/posts/4514507 -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: Russia want completely ban Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
by rysiek 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

Ciekawy wątek na cpunks: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-August/005288.html ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Russia want completely ban Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies Data: piątek, 1 sierpnia 2014, 20:10:55 Od: Anton Nesterov Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Ministry of Finance of Russia drafted a bill to ban cryptocurrencies with administrative or criminal penalty for mining and other operation. Also they want to censor bitcoin-related websites. This will come into force in 2015. http://top.rbc.ru/economics/01/08/2014/940521.shtml (in Russian) ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Pierwsze zdjęcia z Woodstocku, jeszcze przed Woodstockiem!
by rysiek 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

Elo, biurka mamy gotowe: https://owncloud.hackerspace.pl/public.php?service=files&t=68e96538faf7df2f… Oslo, save the link, tu będą się pojawiały wszystkie łutstokowe wzdęcia. :) -- Pozdr rysiek

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[OT] Promocja na certy SSL
by viq 02 Aug '14

02 Aug '14

Znajomy na to trafił: https://www.namecheap.com/campaigns/2014/reset-the-net.aspx "Let’s Take Back Our Online Privacy Namecheap believes in every user’s right to privacy on the internet. That’s why we have partnered with Fight for the Future, in support of Reset the Net, to end inappropriate surveillance online. The best way to protect your customers’ valuable information is with an SSL. That’s why we’re offering two great deals on site security: Use the coupon codes below to get a one-year Comodo PositiveSSL certificate for just $1.99 and/or RapidSSL cert for $4.99. Restrictions apply. * For every SSL sold, we’ll donate $0.50 to Fight for the Future. When * the number of SSLs sold tops 5000, we’ll double that donation amount. " -- viq

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Odp: Re: Badania polskich hackerspace - wyniki wstępne
by Marcin Zarod 01 Aug '14

01 Aug '14

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Badania polskich hackerspace - wyniki wstępne
by Marcin 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

Nagranie referatu prezentującego wstępne wyniki badań etnograficznych w kilku polskich HS-ach: http://www.mixcloud.com/MarcinZ/subkultury-epistemiczne/ Slajdy do referatu: https://www.academia.edu/7831150/Subkultury_epistemiczne Bardzo dziękuję wszystkim osobom, które mi pomogły - mam nadzieję, że znajdą się fundusze na kontynuację i rozwinięcie badań. Na razie mam środki, aby pojechać w kilka miejsc w Polsce na weekend z grupką studentów (w ramach praktyk i jako obiektywizacja badania). Stay tuned. Pozdrawiam Marcin Zaród Instytut Socjologii UW / CN Kopernik

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o hakerach i hakerspejsach w TokFM, dzisiaj, 22:00
by Jaroslaw Gorny 26 Jul '14

26 Jul '14

hej, jak w temacie - Rysiek (głównie) i ja (trochę) opowiadamy o hakerach. Puszczam na general, bo transmitują też w sieci, więc każdy może posłuchać. Zapraszamy! -- Jarosław Górny RHCE: 805008212834187

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Hakerzy na Zielonym Jazdowie
by rysiek 25 Jul '14

25 Jul '14

Cześć, To toto, o czym mówiliśmy z Jarosławem w TokFM: http://zielonawarszawa.blogspot.com/2014/07/hackerzy-w-zielonym-jazdowie.ht… IMHO nie jest źle, choć trochę jest zabawa z serii "co haker powiedział? co reporter zrozumiał?". ;) -- Pozdr rysiek

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link between p!=np and schrodinger's equation
by cyryl 25 Jul '14

25 Jul '14

fasten yer seatbelts https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/the-astounding-link-between-the-p…

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Food for thought
by arachnist＠i.am-a.cat 24 Jul '14

24 Jul '14

https://medium.com/the-nib/the-laughing-muggers-80b1b36e4448

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Fwd: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked
by rysiek 24 Jul '14

24 Jul '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: HOPEx report: My panel surveilled, phone hacked Data: czwartek, 24 lipca 2014, 12:59:07 Od: Douglas Lucas Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Hi cypherpunks, I was a panelist on HOPE X's ProjectPM panel, which discussed crowdsourcing research into private surveillance contractors like Palantir, HBGary, Stratfor...and it appears some of those (Stratfor?) came to record our panel. There's also what happened to my phone. All of this is written up in my HOPEx report, which y'all might find interesting: http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/07/23/report-from-hope-x-surveillance-snowd… Thanks, Douglas ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Wprost "haker" fail
by rysiek 24 Jul '14

24 Jul '14

Cześć, dlnx podesłał: http://www.wprost.pl/ar/458921/Hakerzy-podszywaja-sie-pod-iPKO-Kradna-pieni… Ja wysłałem im takie coś: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Szanowni Państwo, z zainteresowaniem przeczytałem informację o próbie wyłudzania danych klientów iPKO, dostępną w serwisie Wprost Online pod adresem: http://www.wprost.pl/ar/458921/Hakerzy-podszywaja-sie-pod-iPKO-Kradna-pieni… Chciałem jednak zwrócić Państwa uwagę na błąd rzeczowy zawarty w artykule - używają Państwo słowa "haker", mając na myśli "włamywacza" lub "złodzieja" korzystającego z technologii cyfrowych. Użycie to jest błędne. Odsyłam do Wikipedii: "osoba o bardzo dużych, praktycznych umiejętnościach informatycznych (lub elektronicznych) która identyfikuje się ze społecznością hakerską. Hakerzy odznaczają się bardzo dobrą orientacją w Internecie, znajomością wielu języków programowania, a także świetną znajomością systemów operacyjnych, w tym zwłaszcza z rodziny Unix (GNU/Linux, BSD itp.)." -- http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haker_%28slang_komputerowy%29 Odsyłam również do świetnych reportaży Katarzyny Błaszczyk: http://www.polskieradio.pl/80/998/Artykul/722965 http://www.polskieradio.pl/80/1007/Artykul/727894 Oraz do artykułów Edwina Bendyka: http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/pomaganie-hakowaniem,434531.html http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/hakerzy-rycerze-wolnosci,437602.html Jako członek-założyciel Warszawskiego Hackerspace'a, Prezes Zarządu Fundacji Wolnego i Otwartego Oprogramowania i sygnatariusz listu otwartego członków społeczności hakerskiej do MON: https://fwioo.pl/article/361/list-otwarty-czlonkow-i-sympatykow-ruchu-haker… ...znajduję takie użycie słowa haker bardzo niefortunnym. Proszę zauważyć, że artykuł na portalu gazeta.pl, na który się autor powołuje, błędu tego nie popełnia. Proszę o poprawienie tego błędu, a jednocześnie serdecznie zapraszam do Warszawskiego Hackerspace'a, w celu bliższego poznania kultury hakerskiej. Z poważaniem, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Jak ktoś ma ochotę wrzucić im coś na ten temat w komentarzach, to ja nie widzę przeszkód. ;) -- Pozdr rysiek P.S. Artykuł "źródłowy" na portalu Gazeta.pl: http://technologie.gazeta.pl/internet/1,104530,16343707,Klienci_PKO_na_celo… Autorem tegoż jest Robert Kędzierski, z którym korespondowaliśmy przy okazji podobnej "wpadki" dawno temu, i efekt jest taki, że już nie rzuca "hakerami" na lewo i prawo.

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BLender + Stepper + Arduino na WOodstock
by spin＠hackerspace.pl 24 Jul '14

24 Jul '14

Siemanko, Zrobiłem mały research i okazuje się że możemy zrobić bardzo fajne warsztaty z podpinania steppera do arduino i kontrolowania go blenderem. Pipeline to: blender python + serial lib arduino + stepstick stepper motor ??? PROFIT! Jedziemy pojutrze, jak ktoś ma pomysły co powinniśmy wziąć na warsztaty poza breadbordami, arduino, stepperami i ew. stepstickami to będę dźwięczny.

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Fwd: Re: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?]
by rysiek 23 Jul '14

23 Jul '14

Stef's six rules of snakeoilness. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Re: Snowden triggers flood of Crapware [was: Gruveo, more secure skype?] Data: środa, 23 lipca 2014, 23:59:25 Od: stef Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 05:24:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > To quote OP... not open source.. not audited.. central servers.. webrtc.. > 'no' logs.. and a shiny link for grins... and then claims it 'looks very > interesting and promising'. WTF, really? I appreciate innocent questions, > but the answer (or at least our response) should be obvious, from those > parameters alone, to someone who's been around for a while. exactly this prompted me to come up with the seven rules of thumb to detect snakeoil: not free software runs in a browser runs on a smartphone the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption keys there is no threat model uses marketing-terminology like "cyber", "military-grade" neglects general sad state of host security -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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etnoprojekt.pl
by "٩(-̮̮̃-̃)۶" 23 Jul '14

23 Jul '14

Panowie, do naszej piwnicy przyszła niewiasta, która ma pewne trudności z naszymi listami dyskusyjnymi, a na wiadomości na naszym fejsbuczku zostały zsagowane. tl;dr 10 dni jeżdżenia po polsce i tworzenie projektów przez 3 ostatnie dni http://etnoprojekt.pl/2.0/etno-projekt-2-0-w-skrocie/ wszystko za darmo, od 1 do 10 września, rejestracja do 28

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iOS compromised. By Apple. By design.
by rysiek 22 Jul '14

22 Jul '14

Cześć, doskonała prezentacja: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Atta… -- Pozdr rysiek

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Re: [HS General] [HS WAW Off Topic] Copyright trolling - jakie kancelarie mają dowody?
by rysiek 22 Jul '14

22 Jul '14

Dnia wtorek, 22 lipca 2014 11:41:28 Zbigniew Łukasiak pisze: > Kancelarie podobno do setek tysięcy ludzi ściągających filmy przez > bittorrent wysyłają wezwania do zapłaty jakiś opłat 'ugodowych'. > Sprawa jest świetnie opisana w Dzienniku Internautów: > http://di.com.pl/news/50282,0,Kancelaria_zada_juz_750_zl_za_rzekome_piractwo > _Ludzie_nie_boja_sie_kar_ale_przeszukan-Marcin_Maj.html (i wiele innych tam > zalinkowanych). Partia Piratów też oczywiście w tej sprawie złożyła > oświadczenie: > http://polskapartiapiratow.pl/2014/07/oswiadczenie-w-sprawie-copyright-troll > ing/ > > Czy ktoś wie jakie dowody kancelarie przedstawiają prokuraturze? Czy > oni po prostu ściągają listy udostępniających z trackerów? Czy może > podglądają pakiety jakie ludzie między sobą przesyłają? Jeśli miałbym strzelać: odpalają klienty Torrenta i zaczynają pobierać materiały, w które "celują", i spisują adresy IP seederów. -- Pozdr rysiek P.S. Odpowiadam na general@, bo dotyczy to całego kraju, a nie tylko Warszawy, i nie jest off-topem.

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Web never forgets
by rysiek 22 Jul '14

22 Jul '14

Cześć, natrafiłem na ciekawy pejper: "The Web never forgets: Persistent tracking mechanisms in the wild is the first large-scale study of three advanced web tracking mechanisms - canvas fingerprinting, evercookies and use of "cookie syncing" in conjunction with evercookies." -- https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/index.html -- Pozdr rysiek

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XX Woodstock za 10 dni, a my z nim
by rysiek 21 Jul '14

21 Jul '14

Elo, jak wiecie, FWiOO, HSWAW, HSKRK, Panoptykon i Centrum Cyfrowe robią wspólnie stoisko na Woodstocku: https://fwioo.pl/article/392/xx-przystanek-woodstock-juz-za-10-dni/ W planie różne fajne rzeczy, a my wciąż zbieramy kasę na paliwo, namiot i inne imponderabilia: https://fwioo.pl/article/388/apel-o-darowizne-przystanek-woodstock-2014/ Halp? :) Każda złotówka się liczy. Oslo, puszczajcie info. Oslo, odwiedźcie nas na Przystanku! -- Pozdr rysiek

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Privacy is dead
by rysiek 21 Jul '14

21 Jul '14

Cześć, obowiązkowa pozycja do obejrzenia: http://new.livestream.com/accounts/686369/events/3195566/videos/57038514/pl… / dzięki za podrzucenie do osoby, która podrzuciła, a nie wiem, czy chce być explicite podana ;) / -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices
by rysiek 21 Jul '14

21 Jul '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices Data: sobota, 19 lipca 2014, 18:20:18 Od: coderman doubt this will surprise anyone; iOS intentionally designed to support surveillance. --- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287614000036 "Identifying back doors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices" by Jonathan Zdziarski Abstract The iOS operating system has long been a subject of interest among the forensics and law enforcement communities. With a large base of interest among consumers, it has become the target of many hackers and criminals alike, with many celebrity thefts (For example, the recent article “How did Scarlett Johansson's phone get hacked?”) of data raising awareness to personal privacy. Recent revelations (Privacy scandal: NSA can spy on smart phone data, 2013 and How the NSA spies on smartphones including the BlackBerry) exposed the use (or abuse) of operating system features in the surveillance of targeted individuals by the National Security Agency (NSA), of whom some subjects appear to be American citizens. This paper identifies the most probable techniques that were used, based on the descriptions provided by the media, and today's possible techniques that could be exploited in the future, based on what may be back doors, bypass switches, general weaknesses, or surveillance mechanisms intended for enterprise use in current release versions of iOS. More importantly, I will identify several services and mechanisms that can be abused by a government agency or malicious party to extract intelligence on a subject, including services that may in fact be back doors introduced by the manufacturer... ''' ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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konwent postapo Old Town
by Paweł Leszczyński 19 Jul '14

19 Jul '14

Czołem, ryś zasugerował, żeby wrzucić tutaj informację o konwencie posapo. Jest dość późno, konwent zaczyna się od poniedziałku, ale może ktoś będzie chciał ogarnąć. A jak nie teraz to w przyszłym roku. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgBCE4Tq0_E Na poprzednim była prezentacja bety BarBota, pojawia się też sporo środowisk okołohaesowych :-) nF

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CfP: Jesień Linuksowa, dbConf
by rysiek 19 Jul '14

19 Jul '14

Cześć Hakiery, mam info od PLUGU, że cały czas otwarte są Call for Papers na: - Jesień Linuksową: http://www.jesien.org/2014/pl/aktualnosci,nadal-trwa-przyjmowanie-propozycj… - dbConf: http://www.dbconf.pl/2014/pl/aktualnosci,nadal-trwa-przyjmowanie-propozycji… Zachęcam. Ja swoje propozycje na Jesień zapodałem (na dbConf za cienki jestem w uszach jako prelegent ;) ). -- Pozdr rysiek

1 0

Fwd: Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections
by rysiek 18 Jul '14

18 Jul '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections Data: piątek, 18 lipca 2014, 06:16:09 Od: coderman Do: Full Disclosure <fulldisclosure(a)seclists.org>, liberationtech <liberationtech(a)mailman.stanford.edu>, cpunks <cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org>, oss- security(a)lists.openwall.com "Strong Security Processes Require Strong Privacy Protections" A request for all security conscious organizations handling vulnerability reports to deploy privacy enhancing technologies. --- With the Snowden disclosures and Google's Project Zero on the minds of security professionals everywhere, it is time to evaluate one more aspect of this renewed focus on 0day and targeted attacks: vulnerability submission to vendors. [0][1] Software vulnerabilities of use to nation states and espionage organizations are recognized as a threat to privacy and basic human rights. Their impact no longer dismissable or discounted given evidence of misuse. I will not discuss hardware vulnerabilities in this treatment as they entail different considerations and constraints. [2] Reporting vulnerabilities of this nature in turn requires strong privacy protections commensurate with the five and six digit monetary values they command, and the adversaries intent on discouraging their discovery or mitigation. [3][4] --- Therefore, any organization handling vulnerability reports must support strong privacy for vulnerability submission. This is mandatory even if most or all issues received via this channel are not 0day, not high value, and entail very little risk to users. The characteristics of a strong private reporting method are: - Email must not be used. In the best circumstances email leaks too much information. In common situations it is passed around clear text, trivially interfered with, and winds through software with huge usability and vulnerability problems. Email for initial security vulnerability reporting must cease immediately. [5][6] - Public web systems for vulnerability reporting must not be used. Like email, this leaks too much information and is vulnerable to a wide array of attacks destroying any privacy intended. [7][8] - Submission of reports via hidden site required. This has become fashionable in media organizations as the "secure drop" for whistleblowers, and it is equally apropriate for vulnerability reporting. This significantly raises the cost of surveilling a vulnerability reporting service, and ensures that passive interception of reported vulnerabilities is impossible. [9] - Encryption of submitted reports required. PGP and GPG are wonderful tools, despite encrypted email being a dismal failure. While the hidden drop may protect the privacy of the reporter, encryption of the report content to specific vulnerability researchers' keys ensures privacy to the receiver. A compromise of the hidden site must not lead to access of reported vulnerabilities. [10] - Submitter anonymity the default. Submissions and communication must accomodate an anonymous identity. If a researcher wishes to claim credit they must opt-in and provide additional information. No psuedonymous account requirements, no key linking across submissions. - Obfuscated disclosure should be available if desired. Capturing 0day in the wild used for espionage or cyber effects is a rare event. Publicly disclosing when, where, and how you obtained such captures ensures you're likely never to see any others. Researchers in position to observe and inspect such events should be able to report the vulnerabilities without credit and without indicating the origin. A vendor could provide a "cover story" for how the vulnerability was discovered internally, to best protect sources' ability to continue to discover these types of weaponized exploits in the wild. Finally, it goes without saying that this privacy applies during reporting and mitigation phases of defect resolution. Once a patch is prepared and public the details of the vulnerability should be public as well, via email list, public blog, or any other useful medium. --- As participants in the security industry it behooves us all to set an example for others and to demonstrate a committment to security and privacy via action. Security conscious organizations handling vulnerability reports can support strong privacy and send a clear message deploying private reporting methods described above. Security researchers must demand strong privacy from organizations they collaborate with, even in the most trivial or minor of circumstances, so that infrequent severe vulnerabilities may also be reported in confidence. Privacy is a basic human right we must all support. Let's demonstrate our support by using privacy enhancing technologies to resolve risks to privacy! best regards, 0. "The NSA Revelations All in One Chart" https://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ 1. "Announcing Project Zero" No link as the announcement is only supported over HTTP; attempt HTTPS and you're redirected to plain-text. This is an embarassment that should be fixed, Google Project Zero! (the other plain-text sites below have not unreasonable exuses ;) 2. "New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms but they are also enabling unparalleled invasions of privacy" https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy 3. "A Declaration of Cyber-War" http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104 '''On July 15, the day Stuxnet’s existence became widely known, the Web sites of two of the world’s top mailing lists for newsletters on industrial-control-systems security fell victim to distributed-denial-of-service attacks...''' 4. "The Real Story of Stuxnet" http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet '''Just as Kaspersky’s engineers were tricking Gauss into communicating with their own servers, those very servers suddenly went down,...''' 5. "Universal Email Encryption Specification" http://ritter.vg/blog-uee_email_encryption.html 6. "Pond" (not like email) https://pond.imperialviolet.org/tech.html 7. "Bullrun (decryption program)" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_%28decryption_program%29 8. "How secure is HTTPS today? How often is it attacked?" https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/how-secure-https-today 9. "How the NSA Attacks Tor/Firefox Users With QUANTUM and FOXACID" https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html (this is what a hard to attack system looks like, and keeping disclosure entirely within the network from clients to hidden sites amplifies the difficulty significantly.) 10. "The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture" https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3724.txt ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

1 0

Zbiórki publiczne
by Maria Skrzypek 18 Jul '14

18 Jul '14

Tak jakby ktoś się jeszcze zastanawiał co to za dziwo: http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosci/996625.html :)

4 3

Fwd: the NSA revelations all in one chart
by rysiek 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: the NSA revelations all in one chart Data: czwartek, 17 lipca 2014, 15:09:14 Od: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org http://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ The NSA Revelations All in One Chart This is a plot of the NSA programs revealed in the past year according to whether they are bulk or targeted, and whether the targets of surveillance are foreign or domestic. Most of the programs fall squarely into the agency’s stated mission of foreign surveillance, but some – particularly those that are both domestic and broad-sweeping – are more controversial. Just as with the New York Magazine approval matrix that served as our inspiration, the placement of each program is based on judgments and is approximate. For more details, read our FAQ or listen to our podcast. Also, take our quiz to test your NSA knowledge. ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

2 1

Fwd: BadBIOS forensics
by rysiek 16 Jul '14

16 Jul '14

---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: BadBIOS forensics Data: środa, 16 lipca 2014, 07:19:47 Od: Bluelotus <bluelotus(a)openmailbox.org> Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics. I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics in /r/badBIOS subreddit of reddit.com. My other threads are in other subreddits. Look at my submit history. My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted. ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

1 0

Orkiestra górniczo-monetarystyczna [bitcoin]
by Marcin 15 Jul '14

15 Jul '14

Pozdrawiam wszystkich Kopaczy! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEthXBHsEac MZ

1 0

Consciousness on-off switch
by rysiek 10 Jul '14

10 Jul '14

OHAI, "When the team zapped the area with high frequency electrical impulses, the woman lost consciousness. She stopped reading and stared blankly into space, she didn't respond to auditory or visual commands and her breathing slowed. As soon as the stimulation stopped, she immediately regained consciousness with no memory of the event. The same thing happened every time the area was stimulated during two days of experiments (Epilepsy and Behavior, doi.org/tgn)." -- http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329762.700 Aleksander? :) -- Pozdr rysiek

1 0

No Silver Bullet - De-identification still doesn't work
by TeMPOraL 09 Jul '14

09 Jul '14

http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf Taki paper będący odpowiedzią na jakiś inny, który rzuca troszkę światła na problem anonimizacji danych. (moim zdaniem pokładanie jakiejkolwiek nadziei w anonimizacji czegokolwiek jest bardzo nierozsądne) Jacek Złydach, http://temporal.pr0.pl/devblog | http://esejepg.pl | http://hackerspace-krk.pl TRC - Bringing you tomorrow's solutions yesterday.

1 0

Free State Project
by rysiek 09 Jul '14

09 Jul '14

Hej, dobry polityczno-społeczny hack jest dobry. :) Projekt przeprowadzenia się 20000 osób do New Hampshire w celu uzyskania realnego wpływu na politykę stanu, w tym tematy związane z prywatnością, i stworzenie "wolnego stanu": http://freestateproject.org/ -- Pozdr rysiek

11 10

Fwd: messing with XKeyScore
by rysiek 06 Jul '14

06 Jul '14

Trololo. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: messing with XKeyScore Data: piątek, 4 lipca 2014, 16:56:41 Od: Eugen Leitl Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1 Errata Security Advanced persistent cybersecurity Friday, July 04, 2014 Jamming XKeyScore Back in the day there was talk about "jamming echelon" by adding keywords to email that the echelon system was supposedly looking for. We can do the same thing for XKeyScore: jam the system with more information than it can handle. (I enumerate the bugs I find in the code as "xks-00xx"). For example, when sending emails, just send from the address "bridges(a)torproject.org" and in the email body include: https://bridges.torproject.org/ bridge = 0.0.0.1:443 bridge = 0.0.0.2:443 bridge = 0.0.0.3:443 ... Continue this for megabytes worth of bridges (xks-0001), and it'll totally mess up XKeyScore. It has no defense against getting flooded with information like this, as far as I can see. Note that the regex only cares about 1 to 3 digit numbers, that means the following will be accepted by the system (xks-0002): bridge = 75.748.86.91:80 The port number matches on 2 to 4 digits ([0-9]{2,4}). Therefore, bridges with port numbers below 10 and above 9999 will be safe. I don't know if this code reflect a limitation in Tor, or but assuming high/low ports are possible, this can be used to evade detection (xks-0011). Strangely, when the port number is parsed, it'll capture the first non-digit character after the port number (xks-0012). This is normally whitespace, but we could generate an email with 256 entries, trying every possible character. A character like < or ' might cause various problems in rendering on an HTML page or generating SQL queries. You can also jam the system with too many Onion addresses (xks-0003), but there are additional ways to screw with those. When looking for Onion addresses, the code uses a regex that contains the following capture clause: ([a-z]+):\/\/) This is looking for a string like "http://" or "https://", but the regex has no upper bounds (xks-0004) and there is no validation. Thus, you can include "goscrewyourself://o987asgia7gsdfoi.onion:443/" in network traffic, and it'll happily insert this into the database. But remember that "no upper bounds" means just that: the prefix can be kilobytes long, megabytes long, or even gigabytes long. You can open a TCP connection to a system you feel the NSA is monitoring, send 5 gigabytes of lower-case letters, followed by the rest of the Onion address, and see what happens. I mean, there is some practical upper bound somewhere in the system,, and when you hit it, there's a good chance bad things will happen. Likewise, the port number for Onion address is captured by the regex (d+), meaning any number of digits (xks-0005). Thus, we could get numbers that overflow 16-bits, 32-bits, 64-bits, or 982745987-bits. Very long strings of digits (megabytes) at this point might cause bad things to happen within the system. There is an extra-special thing that happens when the schema part of the Onion address is exactly 16-bytes long (xks-0006). This will cause the address and the scheme to reverse themselves when inserted into the database. Thus, we can insert digits into the scheme field. This might foul up later code that assumes schemes only contain letters, because only letters match in the regex. In some protocol fields, the regexes appear to be partial matches. The system appears to match on HTTP servers with "mixminion" anywhere in the name. Thus, we start causing lots of traffic to go to our domains, such as "mixminion.robertgraham.com", that will cause their servers to fill up with long term storage of sessions they don't care about (xks-0007) Let's talk X.509, and the following code: fingerprint('anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls') = ssl_x509_subject('bridges.torproject.org') or ssl_dns_name('bridges.torproject.org'); Code that parses X.509 certificates is known to be flaky as all get out. The simplest thing to do is find a data center you feel the NSA can monitor, and then setup a hostile server that can do generic fuzzing of X.509 certificates, trying to crash them. It's likely that whatever code is parsing X.509 certificates is not validating them. Thus, anybody can put certificates on their servers claiming to be 'bridges.torproject.org' (xks-0008). It's likely that the NSA is parsing SSL on all ports, so just pick a random port on your server not being used for anything else, create a self-signed CERT claiming to be "bridges.torproject.org', then create incoming links to that port from other places so at least search-engines will follow that link and generate traffic. This will cause the NSA database of bridges to fill up with bad information -- assuming it's not already full from people screwing with the emails as noted above :). <img src="http://www.google.com/?q=tails+usb" /> Putting the above code in a web page like this one will cause every visitor to trigger a search for TAILS in the XKeyScore rules. The more people who do this, the less useful it becomes to the NSA (xks-0009) in labeling people as suspicious. Likewise, putting <title>tails.boum.org/<.title> in your webpages will cause the same effect, even when CSS/JavaScript makes such a title invisible. In theory, the NSA should only be monitoring foreign traffic, and not traffic originating from the United States (or, apparently, the other five-eyes). So here is the fun thing (xks-0010): run your jamming tools from United States IP addresses against those servers in Iran you know the NSA is monitoring. Since the code should already be ignoring the traffic because it originates from the United States, then they can't complain if you've filled up their databases full of Tor Onion and bridge addresses. Robert Graham ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

5 11

Microsoft rozdaje Intel Galileo
by Kuba Niewiarowski 04 Jul '14

04 Jul '14

Chyba jeszcze nie było, więc podrzucam - może ktoś się załapie: http://www.windowsondevices.com/ -- Pozdrawiam, Kuba Niewiarowski.IT

16 35

Fwd: Invitation to compete in PayPal Hackathon> $100, 000 Prize!
by rysiek 04 Jul '14

04 Jul '14

Cześć, po akcji z blokowaniem WikiLeaks, MailPile, a ostatnio ProtonMail, mam pomysł, by im odpisać "spadajcie na drzewo, polskie haesy nie są zainteresowane współpracą z FailPalem" (oczywiście nieco inaczej ubierając to w słowa). Co Wy na to? Who's in? ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Invitation to compete in PayPal Hackathon> $100,000 Prize! Data: środa, 2 lipca 2014, 16:50:12 Od: Daud, Muhammad <mdaud(a)paypal.com> Do: kontakt(a)hackerspace.pl <kontakt(a)hackerspace.pl> Hi, I’m a Marketing Specialist with PayPal and wanted to invite you and your members to our hackathon -> https://2014.battlehack.org/warsaw#register BattleHack is a series of global hackathons organized by PayPal. This is a great opportunity to gain exposure, have a chance to meet with other developers/designers in the industry AND the chance to compete for $100K (plus, many other exciting prizes at BattleHack). We have John Lunn, Borys Musielak, Krzysztof Kowalczyk and Brenden Arakaki on our judging panel. Below is what we would like to share with your members regarding BattleHack Warsaw, to be held on July 12-13 at Nowy Fort inWarsaw. There is also an opportunity for PayPal Developer to sponsor your meetup/group and I would love to talk to you about it. It will be great to collaborate, strengthen our relationship and continue to innovate constantly. Email Blast: If you can please send out the following message to your meetup/group members, it’ll be great. Please feel free to customize the message so that it fits your voice, language and style. Get Your Tickets Now for Battle Hack Warsaw! We are pleased to announce, from PayPal Developer, that tickets for BattleHack Warsaw are now available! Make sure you don't miss out for a chance to win $100,000 USD with your code! Battle Hack Warsaw will be held at Nowy Fort and we expect it to be just as awesome as everything you have come to expect from PayPal. Massages, beer and gourmet food are ready for you! Head over to https://2014.battlehack.org/warsaw#register and secure your chance to win our epic Axe Trophy and a chance at $100,000 USD. Most importantly, create an app that will help Warsaw! We hope to see you there! If you have any questions, please feel free to email me at mdaud(a)paypal.com<mailto:mdaud@paypal.com>. I am looking forward to talking to you. Thank you, Muhammad Daud Marketing Specialist [cid:797D757A-7A06-4192-AB43-92707C5E22A9] twitter.com/paypaldev<https://twitter.com/paypaldev> WIN $100,000 USD: http://battlehack.org/ [Small axe] ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

6 15

Fwd: NSA targets the privacy-conscious
by rysiek 03 Jul '14

03 Jul '14

Dzieje się. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: NSA targets the privacy-conscious Data: czwartek, 3 lipca 2014, 17:29:47 Od: Eugen Leitl http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html NSA targets the privacy-conscious von J. Appelbaum, A. Gibson, J. Goetz, V. Kabisch, L. Kampf, L. Ryge The investigation discloses the following: Two servers in Germany - in Berlin and Nuremberg - are under surveillance by the NSA. Merely searching the web for the privacy-enhancing software tools outlined in the XKeyscore rules causes the NSA to mark and track the IP address of the person doing the search. Not only are German privacy software users tracked, but the source code shows that privacy software users worldwide are tracked by the NSA. Among the NSA's targets is the Tor network funded primarily by the US government to aid democracy advocates in authoritarian states. The XKeyscore rules reveal that the NSA tracks all connections to a server that hosts part of an anonymous email service at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It also records details about visits to a popular internet journal for Linux operating system users called "the Linux Journal - the Original Magazine of the Linux Community", and calls it an "extremist forum". Disclosure Three authors of this investigation have personal and professional ties to the Tor Project, an American company mentioned within the following investigation. Jacob Appelbaum is a paid employee of the Tor Project, Aaron Gibson is a paid contractor for the Tor Project, and Leif Ryge is a volunteer contributor to various Tor-related software projects. Their research in this story is wholly independent from the Tor Project and does not reflect the views of the Tor Project in any way. During the course of the investigation, it was further discovered that an additional computer system run by Jacob Appelbaum for his volunteer work with helping to run part of the Tor network was targeted by the NSA. Moreover, all members of this team are Tor users and appear to be have been targets of the mass surveillance described in the investigation. It is a small server that looks like any of the other dozens in the same row. It is in a large room devoted to computers and computer storage, just like every other room in this industrial park building on Am Tower Street just outside the city of Nuremberg. That the grey building is surrounded by barbed wire seems to indicate that the servers' provider is working hard to secure their customers' data. Yet despite these efforts, one of the servers is targeted by the NSA. The IP address 212.212.245.170 is explicitly specified in the rules of the powerful and invasive spy software program XKeyscore. The code is published here exclusively for the first time. After a year of NSA revelations based on documents that focus on program names and high-level Powerpoint presentations, NDR and WDR are revealing NSA source code that shows how these programs function and how they are implemented in Germany and around the world. Months of investigation by the German public television broadcasters NDR and WDR, drawing on exclusive access to top secret NSA source code, interviews with former NSA employees, and the review of secret documents of the German government reveal that not only is the server in Nuremberg under observation by the NSA, but so is virtually anyone who has taken an interest in several well-known privacy software systems. The NSA program XKeyscore is a collection and analysis tool and "a computer network exploitation system", as described in an NSA presentation. It is one of the agency’s most ambitious programs devoted to gathering "nearly everything a user does on the internet." The source code contains several rules that enable agents using XKeyscore to surveil privacy-conscious internet users around the world. The rules published here are specifically directed at the infrastructure and the users of the Tor Network, the Tails operating system, and other privacy-related software. Tor, also known as The Onion Router, is a network of several thousand volunteer-operated servers, or nodes, that work in concert to conceal Tor users' IP addresses and thus keep them anonymous while online. Tails is a privacy-focused GNU/Linux-based operating system that runs entirely from an external storage device such as a USB stick or CD. It comes with Tor and other privacy tools pre-installed and configured, and each time it reboots it automatically wipes everything that is not saved on an encrypted persistent storage medium. Normally a user's online traffic - such as emails, instant messages, searches, or visits to websites - can be attributed to the IP address assigned to them by their internet service provider. When a user goes online over the Tor Network, their connections are relayed through a number of Tor nodes using another layer of encryption between each server such that the first server cannot see where the last server is located and vice-versa. Tor is used by private individuals who want to conceal their online activity, human rights activists in oppressive regimes such as China and Iran, journalists who want to protect their sources, and even by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in their efforts to infiltrate criminal groups without revealing their identity. The Tor Project is a non-profit charity based in Massachusetts and is primarily funded by government agencies. Thus it is ironic that the Tor Network has become such a high-priority target in the NSA's worldwide surveillance system. As revealed by the British newspaper The Guardian, there have been repeated efforts to crack the Tor Network and de-anonymize its users. The top secret presentations published in October last year show that Tor is anathema to the NSA. In one presentation, agents refer to the network as "the king of high-secure, low-latency internet anonymity". Another is titled "Tor Stinks". Despite the snide remarks, the agents admit, "We will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time". The former NSA director General Keith Alexander stated that all those communicating with encryption will be regarded as terror suspects and will be monitored and stored as a method of prevention, as quoted by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in August last year. The top secret source code published here indicates that the NSA is making a concerted effort to combat any and all anonymous spaces that remain on the internet. Merely visiting privacy-related websites is enough for a user's IP address to be logged into an NSA database. An examination of the XKeyscore rules published here goes beyond the slide presentation and provides a window into the actual instructions given to NSA computers. The code was deployed recently and former NSA employees and experts are convinced that the same code or similar code is still in use today. The XKeyscore rules include elements known as "appids", "fingerprints", and "microplugins". Each connection a user makes online - to a search engine, for example - can be assigned a single appid and any number of fingerprints. Appids are unique identifiers for a connection in XKeyscore. Appid rules have weights assigned to them. When multiple appids match a given connection, the one with the highest weight is chosen. Microplugins may contain software written in general-purpose programming languages, such as C++, which can extract and store specific types of data. The rules specifically target the Tor Project's email and web infrastructure, as well as servers operated by key volunteers in Germany, the United States, Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands. Beyond being ethically questionable, the attacks on Tor also raise legal concerns. The IP addresses of Tor servers in the United States are amongst the targets, which could violate the fourth amendment of the US constitution. The German attorney Thomas Stadler, who specializes in IT law, commented: "The fact that a German citizen is specifically traced by the NSA, in my opinion, justifies the reasonable suspicion of the NSA carrying out secret service activities in Germany. For this reason, the German Federal Public Prosecutor should look into this matter and initiate preliminary proceedings." One of NSA's German targets is 212.212.245.170. The string of numbers is an IP address assigned to Sebastian Hahn, a computer science student at the University of Erlangen. Hahn operates the server out of a grey high-security building a few kilometers from where he lives. Hahn, 28 years old and sporting a red beard, volunteers for the Tor Project in his free time. He is especially trusted by the Tor community, as his server is not just a node, it is a so-called Directory Authority. There are nine of these worldwide, and they are central to the Tor Network, as they contain an index of all Tor nodes. A user's traffic is automatically directed to one of the directory authorities to download the newest list of Tor relays generated each hour. Quellcode NSA "anonymizer/tor/node/authority" fingerprint. Hahn's predecessor named the server Gabelmoo, or Fork Man, the nickname of a local statue of Poseidon. After a look at the NSA source code, Hahn quickly found his server's name listed in the XKeyscore rules. "Yes, I recognize the IP address of my Tor server called 'gabelmoo'." he said. "Millions of people use it to stay safe online, and by watching the server and collecting metadata about its users, those people are put at risk." The rule shown to Hahn, published below, has a fingerprint called 'anonymizer/tor/node/authority'. The fingerprint targets users who connect to Gabelmoo and other Tor Directory Authority servers. In Germany, the Tor Directory Authorities like Gabelmoo that are specifically targeted by XKeyscore rules are in Berlin and Nuremberg. Additional targets are located in Austria, Sweden, the United States, and the Netherlands. Quellcode NSA Fragments of XKeyscore rules targetting Tor directory authorities. The expression below performs essentially the same function, but it specifies the Tor directory authorities located in Five Eyes countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) separately from those in other countries. As the comment explains, the "goal is to find potential Tor clients connecting to the Tor directory servers." Another rule catalogs users connecting to known Tor relays. This is not difficult, because the addresses of all normal Tor relays are published by the directory authorities so that the Tor software on users' computers can select its own path through the network. In addition to the public relays, connections characterized as Tor based on protocol identifiers are also cataloged. Not only Metadata Internet service providers in countries with strong censorship such as China and Iran frequently block connections to known Tor relays. To avoid this blocking, The Tor Project maintains a list of non-public relays called "bridges" to allow users to avoid this type of blocking. Bridges are run by volunteers and they share the details with the Tor Project to help censored users reach the internet. Quellcode NSA Microplugin which extracts bridge addresses from the full text of Tor Project emails. Users can request a bridge address via email or on the web. The following fingerprints show two ways that XKeyscore attempts to track Tor bridge users. First, the fingerprint "anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls" records connections to the bridges.torproject.org server. Second, in order obtain the actual bridge addresses for the purpose of tracking connections to them in the future, the "microplugin" fingerprint called "anonymizer/tor/bridge/email" extracts data from the body of the emails that the Tor Project sends to its users. This code demonstrates the ease with which an XKeyscore rule can analyze the full content of intercepted connections. The fingerprint first checks every message using the "email_address" function to see if the message is to or from "bridges(a)torproject.org". Next, if the address matched, it uses the "email_body" function to search the full content of the email for a particular piece of text - in this case, "https://bridges.torproject.org/". If the "email_body" function finds what it is looking for, it passes the full email text to a C++ program which extracts the bridge addresses and stores them in a database. Quellcode NSA Fingerprint to identify visitors to the Tor Project website. The full content of the email must already be intercepted before this code can analyze it. XKeyscore also keeps track of people who are not using Tor, but who are merely visiting The Tor Project's website (www.torproject.org), as this rule demonstrates: Quellcode NSA Rules targeting people viewing the Tails or Linux Journal websites, or performing Tails-related web searches. It is interesting to note that this rule specifically avoids fingerprinting users believed to be located in Five Eyes countries, while other rules make no such distinction. For instance, the following fingerprint targets users visiting the Tails and Linux Journal websites, or performing certain web searches related to Tails, and makes no distinction about the country of the user. The comment in the source code above describes Tails as "a comsec mechanism advocated by extremists on extremist forums". In actuality, the software is used by journalists, human rights activists, and hundreds of thousands of ordinary people who merely wish to protect their privacy. The rules related to Tails clearly demonstrate how easily web searches and website visits can be spied on by XKeyscore. On June 25, 2014, the United States Supreme Court noted how sensitive this type of information is in their Riley v. California decision against warrantless searches of mobile phones: "An Internet search and browsing history [...] could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns - perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD." Quellcode NSA C++ program which searches "raw traffic" for .onion addresses. In addition to anonymous internet access, Tor also provides a mechanism for hosting anonymous internet services called "Hidden Services". These sites' URLs contain a domain name in the pseudo-top-level-domain ".onion" which is only accessible using Tor. The code shown below finds and catalogs URLs for these sites which XKeyscore sees in "raw traffic", creating a unique fingerprint for each onion address. Each .onion address found in raw traffic is extracted and stored in an NSA database: Quellcode NSA "anonymizer/mailer/mixminion" appid matching all connections to 128.31.0.34. There are also rules that target users of numerous other privacy-focused internet services, including HotSpotShield, FreeNet, Centurian, FreeProxies.org, MegaProxy, privacy.li and an anonymous email service called MixMinion as well as its predecessor MixMaster. The appid rule for MixMinion is extremely broad as it matches all traffic to or from the IP address 128.31.0.34, a server located on the MIT campus. That server is operated by the Tor Project's leader Roger Dingledine, an MIT alumnus. The machine at this IP address provides many services besides MixMinion, and it is also one of the above-mentioned Tor directory authorities. Dingledine said "That computer hosts many websites, ranging from open source gaming libraries to the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium website." Sebastian Hahn, the Tor volunteer who runs Gabelmoo, was stunned to learn that his hobby could interest the NSA: "This shows that Tor is working well enough that Tor has become a target for the intelligence services. For me this means that I will definitely go ahead with the project.” When asked for a reaction to the findings, the Tor Project's Roger Dingledine stated the following: "We've been thinking of state surveillance for years because of our work in places where journalists are threatened. Tor's anonymity is based on distributed trust, so observing traffic at one place in the Tor network, even a directory authority, isn't enough to break it. Tor has gone mainstream in the past few years, and its wide diversity of users - from civic-minded individuals and ordinary consumers to activists, law enforcement, and companies - is part of its security. Just learning that somebody visited the Tor or Tails website doesn't tell you whether that person is a journalist source, someone concerned that her Internet Service Provider will learn about her health conditions, or just someone irked that cat videos are blocked in her location. Trying to make a list of Tor's millions of daily users certainly counts as wide scale collection. Their attack on the bridge address distribution service shows their "collect all the things" mentality - it's worth emphasizing that we designed bridges for users in countries like China and Iran, and here we are finding out about attacks by our own country. Does reading the contents of those mails violate the wiretap act? Now I understand how the Google engineers felt when they learned about the attacks on their infrastructure.” NDR and WDR wanted to know from the NSA how it justified attacking a service funded by the U.S. government, under what legal authority Tor Network users are monitored, and whether the German government has any knowledge of the targeting of servers in Germany. Instead of adressing the questions repeatedly posed to them, the NSA provided the following statement: "In carrying out its mission, NSA collects only what it is authorized by law to collect for valid foreign intelligence purposes - regardless of the technical means used by foreign intelligence targets. The communications of people who are not foreign intelligence targets are of no use to the agency. In January, President Obama issued U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 28, which affirms that all persons - regardless of nationality - have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information, and that privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities. The president's directive also makes clear that the United States does not collect signals intelligence for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion. XKeyscore is an analytic tool that is used as a part of NSA's lawful foreign signals intelligence collection system. Such tools have stringent oversight and compliance mechanisms built in at several levels. The use of XKeyscore allows the agency to help defend the nation and protect U.S. and allied troops abroad. All of NSA's operations are conducted in strict accordance with the rule of law, including the President's new directive." However, the research contradicts the United States' promise to Germany that German citizens are not surveiled without suspicion. Using Tor in Germany does not justify targeting someone, the German attorney Thomas Stadler states: "Tor users do not breach any laws, it is absolutely legitimate to act anonymously on the internet. There are many good reasons to remain anonymous." What is deep packet inspection? Deep Packet Inspection, or DPI, refers to the class of technology which examines the content of data packets as they travel across a network. A packet is the fundamental unit of transfer in packet switched networks like the internet. While DPI is commonly used by organizations to monitor their own networks, its use on public networks for censorship and surveillance has been widely condemned by privacy advocates and the United States government alike. In 2012, the head of the U.S. Delegation to the World Conference on International Telecommunications, U.S. Ambassador Terry Kramer, said “some companies have used deep packet inspection technologies to not look at aggregate customer information, traffic information, et cetera, but to look at individual customer information. So looking at individuals and what sites they’re on and how much capacity they’re using, et cetera, as you can imagine, we’re very much opposed to that because we feel that’s a violation of people’s privacy and gets into, obviously, censorship, et cetera”. Despite its public political condemnations of invasive DPI use, the United States "Intelligence Community" and its "Five Eyes" partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) operate massive internet-scale DPI systems themselves, including XKeyscore. The use of XKeyscore is not limited to these partners, however. The software has been shared with the German BND and BfV, as well as the Swedish FRA, amongst others. Active vs Passive XKeyscore and the systems that feed it are considered "passive", meaning that they silently listen but do not transmit anything on the networks that they are targeting. However, through a process known as "tipping", data from these programs can trigger other systems which perform "active" attacks. Quantum is a family of such programs, including Quantuminsert, Quantumhand, Quantumtheory, Quantumbot, and Quantumcopper, which are used for offensive computer intrusion. Turmoil, Quantum, and other components of the Turbulence architecture are running at so-called "defensive sites" including the Ramstein Air Force base in Germany, Yokota Air Force base in Japan, and numerous military and non-military locations within the United States. Both Turmoil and XKeyscore feed selected data to real-time "tipping" programs, such as Trafficthief, which can both alert NSA analysts when their targets are communicating and trigger other software programs. Selected data is "promoted" from the local XKeyscore data store to the NSA's so-called "corporate repositories" for long term storage, analysis and exploitation. More information about XKeyscore In 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian revealed that by 2008 more than 150 internet surveillance facilities around the world were running the XKeyscore Deep Packet Inspection software. All of the internet traffic observed by XKeyscore, both metadata and full content, is analyzed and stored temporarily at the collection sites for periods ranging from days to weeks, while selected data is forwarded on to other locations for long-term storage. The storage, indexing, and querying functions are performed at or near the collection sites because the volume of data being collected is too large to forward everything back to facilities in other countries. Analysts working from various locations around the world may search specific XKeyscore sites, or send their queries to a collection of sites. XKeyscore provides a modular architecture in which tens of thousands of small computer programs, or rules, written in XKeyscore's specialized programming languages called Genesis and XKScript as well as general-purpose languages such as C++ and Python, are run against all traffic to categorize it and extract data. This indexing of the "full take" allows analysts to query the temporary storage stored at the XKeyscore site, effectively sifting through already pilfered communications which occurred before they had deemed them interesting for a specific reason. XKeyscore can be fed by several different programs, including Wealthycluster and Turmoil. These programs "sessionize" the data, which means that individual connections, such as a request for a web page, are reconstructed from the stream of intercepted packets. Locations where the NSA runs XKeyscore include Special Source Operations (SSO) sites, typically found at or near major telecommunication providers' infrastructure; Special Collection Service (SCS) sites, usually located inside diplomatic facilities like embassies and consulates; and FORNSAT sites where satellite communications are intercepted. All of these types of sites are known to exist in Germany. Other "Five Eyes" partners also operate XKeyscore installations. The United Kingdom's Tempora program runs the largest instance of XKeyscore. Both the software itself and limited access to NSA databases have been shared with so-called "3rd party" partners including Germany. The German foreign intelligence agency BND and the domestic intelligence agency BfV are testing the Software. ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: Re: [tor-talk] Tor Exit Operator convicted in Austrian lower court
by rysiek 03 Jul '14

03 Jul '14

Więcej o wyroku co do Tor exit node w Austrii. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Re: [tor-talk] Tor Exit Operator convicted in Austrian lower court Data: piątek, 4 lipca 2014, 01:34:02 Od: Zenaan Harkness (Thread start: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/033573.html ) On 7/3/14, Anders Andersson <pipatron(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Moritz Bartl <moritz(a)torservers.net> wrote: >> On 07/02/2014 11:00 PM, Anders Andersson wrote: >>> Unfortunately he doesn't seem to want to take this further, so the >>> ruling will stand. It's his choice, but it could be a very bad >>> deterrent to other potential exit node operators in Austria. >> >> We are in contact with William, and quite possibly there is the option >> of following this further with another Austrian operator who >> self-reports himself, with our help. Please everyone give us time to >> look into this together with some lawyers. > > Thank you! That's amazing! I'm quite sure that the support you get > from the Tor community when running an exit node really helps in > giving people the courage to do so. Agreed, great news. In hindsight, it is clear that we as a community have an interest to build a resource of amicus curiae briefs - friend of the court briefs. So PLEASE make moves in the direction of contributing and collecting documents which may be relevant to future cases - at the least a simple collection of legal docs. We have an interest in protecting our free-speech networks (Tor, I2P etc), legally as well as technologically and politically. The Torproject.org website does a good job IMHO of presenting the social case for free-speech networks. No matter the circumstances of a particular case (a particular free speech node operator), we the global free-speech promoting and free-speech facilitating community, have an interest to advise the courts regarding matters of technology and free speech, in order to maximise the sanity of the outcomes brought about by our courts (and yes, another operators courts are as good as mine, in terms of global impact). For example a tor-network node operator charged for actual illegal activity, should not cause legal suppression of free-speech networks in general. To kick things off, here's the gist of what I have in mind (this is in no way directly responsive to the case that started this thread, which I know nothing about): " In this matter an individual has been charged with a [criminal] offence. The case of a matter of an individual committing a proven criminal defamation or incitement must not be used by the court to suppress free speech generally by way of the court's power of judicial sanction. Similarly in this case the [Defendant] was the operator of a 'digital communications facility' which facility was a node in a free-speech network, in particular the [Tor|I2P} free speech network; where the operator is found by this court to have committed unlawful acts, then this court must only target those unlawful acts when it makes its determinations, by way of this court's power of judicial sanction exercised according to law; and this court must not reach beyond those unlawful acts in its determinations/ rulings/ sanctions; if the court exercises its power in reaching beyond those unlawful acts then such exercise of judicial power is likely to undermine confidence in the court by all other operators of the free-speech network and by users of the free speech network. A ruling by this court will be seen by many humans around the world, both operators of free speech nodes in the free speech networks, as well as by users and by potential users of free speech networks around the world. In this case, the rulings of this court are visible globally, and shall be watched by many; there is therefore a great burden upon this court in this case, and this court therefore has a special duty of care when it makes its rulings/ determinations, to be conservative and cautious, in particular regarding any general deterrents this court might ordinarily be minded to create by its rulings which deterrents might unintentionally dampen confidence in this court and/ or confidence in the courts generally to protect our human rights including freedom of communication. This court must be especially careful in its rulings in this matter, since the court is in a position to bring about chilling effects upon the liberties of not only those humans within its immediate jurisdictions, but also upon the broader global community. " (A glosary, localisation, much enhancement and other legal polishing would be required of course, along with subroutined/ separate submissions regarding each relevant law, and regarding each relevant precedent in the jurisdiction in question and/ or in jurisdictions relevant (some cases/precedents are so poignant, so timeless, that they apply all over the world, e.g. the Credit River Decision, as well as the trial of William Penn).) Such advice or briefs to the court are ideally tailored to each particular country/jurisdiction. However, even a brief prepared for some country other than the country at issue, is likely to be useful to those attempting to create a brief for a particular case in another country, and may even be directly useful as a filing in its own right, at least if the language is the same :) Regarding the filing of briefs, we need standing to file; that is, we need an interest in the matter which interest is seen by the court. In some countries particular organisations may be ideal for the filing of such briefs, such as the FSF and EFF (USA) and EFA (Australia). In other countries, if there is no directly applicable organisation, then a "designated representative of the Torproject" who is resident in that country, may have standing to make such a filing. Alternatively, a local human-rights-friendly politician may be amenable to making the filing on behalf of their constituent(s) (that's us). Finally, in general any individual should have standing to make such a filing, since we have an interest in our own human rights - free speech is a fundamental human right - so we should also aim for the preparation and collection of briefs file-able by ourselves. Take notice, we HAVE A DUTY OF CARE to each other, and to the broader community, to contact Torproject and/ or others in this community, if ever we find ourselves in a court case involving the operation of any free speech network node (I2P, Tor, exit or relay), in order that those in the community who have an interest, ie the rest of us (at least those of us in the same country), are given the opportunity to make our interest known to the respective court(s) in that jurisdiction, by way of filing appropriate and standardized briefs. Zenaan ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Fwd: Court – Official statement part #1
by rysiek 02 Jul '14

02 Jul '14

Cześć, Wyrok za hostowanie Tor exit node'a. :/ ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Court – Official statement part #1 Data: środa, 2 lipca 2014, 18:41:25 Od: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> Do: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org, cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Apologies, not sure this has been posted already in the thread, I'm backlogged. https://rdns.im/court-official-statement-part-1 Court – Official statement part #1 Posted on July 2, 2014 by Will As seen possibly here, or here i lost the Tor case and was sentenced to 3 years probation (instead of 3 months jail) and all fees (court and experts, Assumption ~30000EUR, not less than 20k for sure). The sentence is based on §12 which allows for anyone to be dealt with as perpetrator (which is a pretty dictatorial law IMO) and this is based on that i knew it *could* possibly be used for criminal activity (in this case child pornography). I won’t write much more yet before i have the written ruling (i do not even know my probation terms yet) but merely want to explain why i won’t appeal this sentence: First would be that I simply can’t afford it anymore, donations covered a lot of lawyer fees but i had to use my entire money on this case as well, i’m now bankrupt and the garnishment (a rare word, DE: Pfändung) of my income (to pay the 20k+ costs) does not help with it either. I have high medical costs as well besides which are more important. I’m not really interested in more external funding due to taxation issues with larger amounts (and i do not want *another* crime on me). – Second is that i just want to be done with this, i had now years of “issues” (i would write “harassment” but then i get sued again for sure) (Ex: Citing my boss to the police for questioning (x3); physically monitoring my boss in Vienna; citing friends to the police for questioning (x2); confiscation of bank transaction data; Polish extradiction threats for hacking cases there (x2); citing me for useless questioning causing lawyer costs (x5+) etc. etc.) – It’s now finally over and besides the cost i CAN live with this sentence, it does not show up in police registers and won’t be an issue for work and alike in the future. – Third is the mental component, this years of “horror” changed a lot up to me being hospitalized (x3…) with paranoid schizophrenia (which was a wrong diagnosis, but still it’s not helpful if you HAVE to assume permanent monitoring of everything), PTSD (among other issues) and now taking medication – It took it’s toll, including me getting fired for being in the clinic/sick stay for a long time, i just can’t afford to loose my job or go the clinic again even if i actually should be still there. – Fourth is the attention, media and personal – I don’t really like any attention on myself, especially when others should get it (like some public cause, Pirateparty or alike). – So this is it for now, stay tuned for more in a few days. ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

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Seminaria socjo / Warszawa [repost we własnym wątku]
by antoszka 02 Jul '14

02 Jul '14

Następnym razem jak będziesz pisał, to nie odpowiadaj na mail, zmiana tematu nie powoduje nowego wątku, tylko napiś świeży, czysty mail na listę. A dla reszty, która mogła przeoczyć oryginalny mail poniżej: > Gdybyście byli zainteresowani to zapraszam Was na dwa moje seminaria w > Pracowni Badań i Innowacji Społecznych Stocznia (Bracka 20b, Warszawa). > > 1. "Wszyscy jesteśmy ekspertami" > O tym jak włączać osoby spoza środowiska naukowego w tworzenie nauki. > Będzie nie tylko o ruchu hackerskim, pacjenckim czy citizen science. > Będzie też o tym w jaki sposób obywatele są włączani w procesy ustalania > celów naukowych (science shops, naukowe budżety partycypacyjne). > > Termin: 10 lipca, godzina 11:00 > > 2. "Niewidoczny uniwersytet. Notatki etnograficzne z obserwacji hackerów" > Będzie o wstępnych wynikach badania Was (tzn. głównie o tym czego nie > wiem, gdzie się pomyliłem i co chciałbym jeszcze zrobić). Będzie też > kilka słów o tym jakie zjawiska z socjologii nauki i techniki formalnej > występują też u Was. > > Termin: 24 lipca, godzina 11:00 > > Na oba spotkania jest wstęp wolny (nie trzeba nawet mówić skąd > jesteście). Dla nieobecnych: po spotkaniach udostępnię nagrania audio i > slajdy. > Pozdrawiam > Marcin Z. Tak, tak, middleposting is the new hip. -- [アントシカ]

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Cortex-M0 Cypressa za 1$ sztuka z darmową wysyłką
by McMonster 01 Jul '14

01 Jul '14

Jak w temacie, same układy, ale tanio, przyjazne amatorom obudowy i darmowa wysyłka międzynarodowa. http://www.cypress.com/?id=2218 -- Pozdrawiam, McMonster

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Virtual Panel: Configuration Management Tools in the Real World
by viq 01 Jul '14

01 Jul '14

http://www.infoq.com/articles/virtual-panel-cfg-mgmt-tools-real-world -- viq <viq(a)hackerspace.pl>

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Fwd: Funding opportunity for Polish hardware startups
by rysiek 01 Jul '14

01 Jul '14

Może kogoś zainteresuje. ---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ---------- Temat: Funding opportunity for Polish hardware startups Data: wtorek, 1 lipca 2014, 12:53:46 Od: Kristel Kont <kristel(a)buildit.ee> Do: kontakt(a)hackerspace.pl Hi! My name is Kristel and I'm community manager at Buildit, a global hardware startups accelerator. I'm reaching out to ask your help finding local hardware startups looking for investment. We are currently taking applications for our next batch and would like to find teams also from Poland. If you find it's a good match and interesting to people in your network, please share the info below via your web/newsletter/social media (I also include links to <https://www.facebook.com/BuilditAccelerator/photos/a.533993580047882.107374 1830.531052760341964/596090080504898/?type=1> Facebook post, <https://twitter.com/BuilditAcc/status/476247140290027520> Twitter post that can be easily shared). And do let me know if you are interested to hear more! Best regards, Kristel Kont Buildit Hardware Accelerator <http://www.builditaccelerator.com> www.builditaccelerator.com Startup accelerator Buildit looking for Polish hardware startups Buildit, the first hardware focused accelerator in Northern and Eastern Europe, is currently taking applications for its next batch starting in September. Apply if your team is working on a product with a hardware component. For example, it might relate to consumer electronics, wearables, IoT, robotics, UAVs - or any other useful, cool physical device. The 3-month programme includes: - equity investment of up to 20K EUR per team - excellent on-site prototyping facilities and free coworking space - network of 90+ high-profile mentors - manufacturing contacts in Asia and much more The deadline is 20 July. Learn more at <http://www.builditaccelerator.com> our <http://bit.ly/builditacc> website and apply <http://bit.ly/applybuildit> here. ----------------------------------------- -- Pozdr rysiek

1 0

OVH-branded OpenStack
by viq 30 Jun '14

30 Jun '14

Wygląda na to, że i ovh weszło w openstacka: https://www.runabove.com/index.xml -- viq

1 0

Open Company Initative - Inicjatywa Otwartego Przedsiębiorstwa
by Kamil Gałuszka 30 Jun '14

30 Jun '14

Hej, Próbuję powoli rozruszać idee Open Company Initiative na polskie podwórko. http://opencompany.org http://opencompany.org/pl Za uwagi do tłumaczenia (lub PR tu: https://github.com/opencompany/www.opencompany.org ) będę serdecznie wdzięczny. Myślę, że idea mocno się wpisuje w WiOO więc rozpowszechniać jeżeli ktoś może. ;). Pozdrawiam Kamil Gałuszka

1 0

ReadySIM: privacy-aware mobile carrier
by rysiek 29 Jun '14

29 Jun '14

Cześć, takie coś się w Stanach pojawiło: http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/03/ready-sim-offers-cheap-short-term-a… https://www.readysim.com/who-its-for.html Brzmi ciekawie, zwłaszcza biorąc pod uwagę, że jest jednoznacznie sprzedawane jako rozwiązanie (m.in.) dla aktywistów. -- Pozdr rysiek

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