http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/martykul.html?kat=1342&wid=17197069&ticaid=11434b&_…
Cytując za wp.pl:
"Szczególne ryzyka doktryna wiąże z wykorzystaniem dla potrzeb
bezpieczeństwa wysoce zinformatyzowanych systemów technicznych obcej
produkcji, zwłaszcza systemów walki i wsparcia (w tym zautomatyzowanych
systemów dowodzenia i kierowania), bez uzyskania dostępu do kodów
źródłowych ich oprogramowania, gwarantujących informatyczne panowanie nad
nimi. "
Należałoby powiedzieć... wreszcie ktoś to chociażby dostrzegł.
--
Marek Zibrow
marek(a)zibrow.pl
Kto ma ochotę? Trzeba złożyć aplikację do dziś...
Wygląda ciekawie!
---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ----------
Temat: Reminder - RIPE Atlas hackathon - deadline approaching & places limited
Data: środa, 21 stycznia 2015, 11:53:08
Od: Vesna Manojlovic <BECHA(a)ripe.net>
Dear all,
I am sending you a reminder, because we have limited number of places
available, and the first deadline is approaching:
If you want part of your travel expenses covered, apply before 21st January.
After that, we will inform those who got selected, and how many more
places do we still have available.
Dates: 27-28-29 March 2015 (Friday to Sunday)
To apply: https://atlas.ripe.net/hackathon/2015/
Hope to see you there!
Or - invite your friends...
Regards,
Vesna
On 11-dec.-14 16:33, Vesna Manojlovic wrote:
> Dear colleagues,
>
> we are happy to invite you to the first RIPE Atlas open data hackathon!
>
> In short: various groups will come together during the long weekend in
> Amsterdam, to make new visualisations (or modify existing ones) based on
> RIPE Atlas data, and to give that SW back to the community. We are
> inviting: programers, designers, operators, data-lovers, hackers,
> students... help us spread the word!
>
> Comcast is generously offering prizes and some coverage for travel
> expenses for several people -- to be awarded/selected by a jury.
>
> Dates: 27-28-29 March 2015 (Friday to Sunday)
>
> How to apply: https://www.ripe.net/s/XUJy
>
> More information in the RIPE Labs article:
>
https://labs.ripe.net/Members/suzanne_taylor_muzzin/ripe-atlas-hackathon-20…
>
>
> Hope to see you there!
>
> Regards,
> Vesna
>
>
>
-----------------------------------------
--
Pozdrawiam,
Michał "rysiek" Woźniak
Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147
GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147
Joł
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electroforming
Jak wiadomo w trawionych PCBkach bólem dupy są niemetalizowane
przelotki, a ich metalizowanie jest jedyną niedopracowaną częścią
procesu produkcji PCBków samoróbek (info od q3k).
Się zastanawiałem byłem zatem czy nie można sobie zrobić na przelotkach
depozycji elektrochemicznej miedzi, i w sumie pomyślałem czemu by nie
robić elektrodepozycji po całości - czyli maskujemy negatyw, nie
pozytyw, i nie usuwamy miedzi, tylko ją nanosimy.
in b4 naniośmy sobie ścieżkę na druk 3d.
Opinions? Suggestions? Rants?
Takie tam, na cyferpankach.
---------- Treść przekazywanej wiadomości ----------
Temat: Re: Keybase
Data: sobota, 17 stycznia 2015, 11:22:02
Od: Mirimir
Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org
On 01/17/2015 03:52 AM, rysiek wrote:
> So,
>
> Mirmir wrote:
>> | 13. Targeted attacks against PGP key ids are possible
>>
>> This is an advantage of Keybase. Then we're not depending on the KeyID,
>> or even on the fingerprint, but rather on an identity that's multiply
>> and independently authenticated.
>
> I keep hearing more and more about keybase, and I have a problem with it.
It's
> a centralised service, owned and controlled by a single entity; moreover,
the
> keys are tied to online identities controlled by corporate third parties
> (Twitter, Facebook, et al). I don't see a Diaspora/The Federation support,
for
> instance.
As I understand it, Keybase is an API. The website/service is merely a
demonstration. The developers are aiming for mass adoption, and so
they've targeted the most popular sites. With some coding, arbitrary
sites could be used, with two requirements. First, it must be possible
for users to post persistent signed proofs. Second, it must be possible
for the API to access those signed proofs, in order to verify them.
> My problem with this is two-fold:
>
> 1. It might allow abuse, esp. MITM attacks. If Keybase becomes a /de facto/
> standard of acquiring keys, it seems trivial to me for them to replace a
> valued target's key with something a LEA would provide.
That's the value of trackers. Those tracking such a comprised target
would see that various public signed proofs are no longer valid for the
target's key on Keybase. The adversary could alter all of the target's
public signed proofs. But even that wouldn't suffice, because trackers
have independent snapshot histories of public proofs. And furthermore,
snapshot histories are embedded in the Bitcoin blockchain.
> 2. It still promotes the closed, walled-gardens. Diaspora or GNU Social
> support would not be that hard to implement.
Signed proofs could be placed anywhere that's accessible to the API. But
that takes coding, and developers have priorities. One can request.
Anyway, I've created a test identity: https://keybase.io/Proba. Once
I've added enough proofs, and have enough trackers, I plan to mess with
it by replacing the public key held by Keybase, altering some of the
proofs, and so on. Then we can see how that shows up for its trackers,
and for other users. I'll also explore impacts of malicious trackers.
-----------------------------------------
--
Pozdrawiam,
Michał "rysiek" Woźniak
Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147
GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147
Cześć,
taka sytuacja:
http://www.dailydot.com/crime/ross-ulbricht-silk-road-mark-karpales-fbi/
DHS fingered Mt. Gox's Mark Karpeles as original Silk Road founder
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Is Mark Karpeles the real Dread Pirate Roberts?
In the third day of the Silk Road trial in New York City, suspect Ross
Ulbricht’s defense has pointed the finger at Karpeles, the former owner of Mt.
Gox, once one the biggest Bitcoin exchanges on the planet.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--
Pozdrawiam,
Michał "rysiek" Woźniak
Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147
GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147