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Temat: the NSA revelations all in one chart
Data: czwartek, 17 lipca 2014, 15:09:14
Od: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org>
Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org
http://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/
The NSA Revelations All in One Chart
This is a plot of the NSA programs revealed in the past year according to
whether they are bulk or targeted, and whether the targets of surveillance
are foreign or domestic. Most of the programs fall squarely into the agency’s
stated mission of foreign surveillance, but some – particularly those that
are both domestic and broad-sweeping – are more controversial.
Just as with the New York Magazine approval matrix that served as our
inspiration, the placement of each program is based on judgments and is
approximate.
For more details, read our FAQ or listen to our podcast. Also, take our quiz
to test your NSA knowledge.
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Pozdr
rysiek
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Temat: BadBIOS forensics
Data: środa, 16 lipca 2014, 07:19:47
Od: Bluelotus <bluelotus(a)openmailbox.org>
Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org
I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD,
infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected
external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics.
I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics in /r/badBIOS
subreddit of reddit.com. My other threads are in other subreddits. Look at my
submit history.
My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted.
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Pozdr
rysiek
OHAI,
"When the team zapped the area with high frequency electrical impulses, the
woman lost consciousness. She stopped reading and stared blankly into space,
she didn't respond to auditory or visual commands and her breathing slowed.
As soon as the stimulation stopped, she immediately regained consciousness
with no memory of the event. The same thing happened every time the area was
stimulated during two days of experiments (Epilepsy and Behavior,
doi.org/tgn)."
-- http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329762.700
Aleksander? :)
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Pozdr
rysiek
Hej,
dobry polityczno-społeczny hack jest dobry. :)
Projekt przeprowadzenia się 20000 osób do New Hampshire w celu uzyskania
realnego wpływu na politykę stanu, w tym tematy związane z prywatnością, i
stworzenie "wolnego stanu":
http://freestateproject.org/
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Pozdr
rysiek
Trololo.
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Temat: messing with XKeyScore
Data: piątek, 4 lipca 2014, 16:56:41
Od: Eugen Leitl
Do: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org
http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/07/jamming-xkeyscore_4.html?m=1
Errata Security
Advanced persistent cybersecurity
Friday, July 04, 2014
Jamming XKeyScore
Back in the day there was talk about "jamming echelon" by adding keywords to
email that the echelon system was supposedly looking for. We can do the same
thing for XKeyScore: jam the system with more information than it can handle.
(I enumerate the bugs I find in the code as "xks-00xx").
For example, when sending emails, just send from the address
"bridges(a)torproject.org" and in the email body include:
https://bridges.torproject.org/
bridge = 0.0.0.1:443
bridge = 0.0.0.2:443
bridge = 0.0.0.3:443
...
Continue this for megabytes worth of bridges (xks-0001), and it'll totally
mess up XKeyScore. It has no defense against getting flooded with information
like this, as far as I can see.
Note that the regex only cares about 1 to 3 digit numbers, that means the
following will be accepted by the system (xks-0002):
bridge = 75.748.86.91:80
The port number matches on 2 to 4 digits ([0-9]{2,4}). Therefore, bridges with
port numbers below 10 and above 9999 will be safe. I don't know if this code
reflect a limitation in Tor, or but assuming high/low ports are possible, this
can be used to evade detection (xks-0011).
Strangely, when the port number is parsed, it'll capture the first non-digit
character after the port number (xks-0012). This is normally whitespace, but
we could generate an email with 256 entries, trying every possible character.
A character like < or ' might cause various problems in rendering on an HTML
page or generating SQL queries.
You can also jam the system with too many Onion addresses (xks-0003), but
there are additional ways to screw with those. When looking for Onion
addresses, the code uses a regex that contains the following capture clause:
([a-z]+):\/\/)
This is looking for a string like "http://" or "https://", but the regex has
no upper bounds (xks-0004) and there is no validation. Thus, you can include
"goscrewyourself://o987asgia7gsdfoi.onion:443/" in network traffic, and it'll
happily insert this into the database. But remember that "no upper bounds"
means just that: the prefix can be kilobytes long, megabytes long, or even
gigabytes long. You can open a TCP connection to a system you feel the NSA is
monitoring, send 5 gigabytes of lower-case letters, followed by the rest of
the Onion address, and see what happens. I mean, there is some practical upper
bound somewhere in the system,, and when you hit it, there's a good chance bad
things will happen.
Likewise, the port number for Onion address is captured by the regex (d+),
meaning any number of digits (xks-0005). Thus, we could get numbers that
overflow 16-bits, 32-bits, 64-bits, or 982745987-bits. Very long strings of
digits (megabytes) at this point might cause bad things to happen within the
system.
There is an extra-special thing that happens when the schema part of the Onion
address is exactly 16-bytes long (xks-0006). This will cause the address and
the scheme to reverse themselves when inserted into the database. Thus, we can
insert digits into the scheme field. This might foul up later code that
assumes schemes only contain letters, because only letters match in the regex.
In some protocol fields, the regexes appear to be partial matches. The system
appears to match on HTTP servers with "mixminion" anywhere in the name. Thus,
we start causing lots of traffic to go to our domains, such as
"mixminion.robertgraham.com", that will cause their servers to fill up with
long term storage of sessions they don't care about (xks-0007)
Let's talk X.509, and the following code:
fingerprint('anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls') =
ssl_x509_subject('bridges.torproject.org') or
ssl_dns_name('bridges.torproject.org');
Code that parses X.509 certificates is known to be flaky as all get out. The
simplest thing to do is find a data center you feel the NSA can monitor, and
then setup a hostile server that can do generic fuzzing of X.509 certificates,
trying to crash them.
It's likely that whatever code is parsing X.509 certificates is not validating
them. Thus, anybody can put certificates on their servers claiming to be
'bridges.torproject.org' (xks-0008). It's likely that the NSA is parsing SSL
on all ports, so just pick a random port on your server not being used for
anything else, create a self-signed CERT claiming to be
"bridges.torproject.org', then create incoming links to that port from other
places so at least search-engines will follow that link and generate traffic.
This will cause the NSA database of bridges to fill up with bad information --
assuming it's not already full from people screwing with the emails as noted
above :).
<img src="http://www.google.com/?q=tails+usb" />
Putting the above code in a web page like this one will cause every visitor to
trigger a search for TAILS in the XKeyScore rules. The more people who do
this, the less useful it becomes to the NSA (xks-0009) in labeling people as
suspicious. Likewise, putting <title>tails.boum.org/<.title> in your webpages
will cause the same effect, even when CSS/JavaScript makes such a title
invisible.
In theory, the NSA should only be monitoring foreign traffic, and not traffic
originating from the United States (or, apparently, the other five-eyes). So
here is the fun thing (xks-0010): run your jamming tools from United States IP
addresses against those servers in Iran you know the NSA is monitoring. Since
the code should already be ignoring the traffic because it originates from the
United States, then they can't complain if you've filled up their databases
full of Tor Onion and bridge addresses.
Robert Graham
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Pozdr
rysiek
Cześć,
po akcji z blokowaniem WikiLeaks, MailPile, a ostatnio ProtonMail, mam pomysł,
by im odpisać "spadajcie na drzewo, polskie haesy nie są zainteresowane
współpracą z FailPalem" (oczywiście nieco inaczej ubierając to w słowa). Co Wy
na to? Who's in?
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Temat: Invitation to compete in PayPal Hackathon> $100,000 Prize!
Data: środa, 2 lipca 2014, 16:50:12
Od: Daud, Muhammad <mdaud(a)paypal.com>
Do: kontakt(a)hackerspace.pl <kontakt(a)hackerspace.pl>
Hi,
I’m a Marketing Specialist with PayPal and wanted to invite you and your
members to our hackathon ->
https://2014.battlehack.org/warsaw#register
BattleHack is a series of global hackathons organized by PayPal. This is a
great opportunity to gain exposure, have a chance to meet with other
developers/designers in the industry AND the chance to compete for $100K
(plus, many other exciting prizes at BattleHack). We have John Lunn, Borys
Musielak, Krzysztof Kowalczyk and Brenden Arakaki on our judging panel.
Below is what we would like to share with your members regarding BattleHack
Warsaw, to be held on July 12-13 at Nowy Fort inWarsaw.
There is also an opportunity for PayPal Developer to sponsor your meetup/group
and I would love to talk to you about it. It will be great to collaborate,
strengthen our relationship and continue to innovate constantly.
Email Blast:
If you can please send out the following message to your meetup/group members,
it’ll be great. Please feel free to customize the message so that it fits your
voice, language and style.
Get Your Tickets Now for Battle Hack Warsaw!
We are pleased to announce, from PayPal Developer, that tickets for BattleHack
Warsaw are now available!
Make sure you don't miss out for a chance to win $100,000 USD with your code!
Battle Hack Warsaw will be held at Nowy Fort and we expect it to be just as
awesome as everything you have come to expect from PayPal.
Massages, beer and gourmet food are ready for you!
Head over to https://2014.battlehack.org/warsaw#register and secure your
chance to win our epic Axe Trophy and a chance at $100,000 USD. Most
importantly, create an app that will help Warsaw!
We hope to see you there!
If you have any questions, please feel free to email me at
mdaud(a)paypal.com<mailto:mdaud@paypal.com>. I am looking forward to talking to
you.
Thank you,
Muhammad Daud
Marketing Specialist
[cid:797D757A-7A06-4192-AB43-92707C5E22A9]
twitter.com/paypaldev<https://twitter.com/paypaldev>
WIN $100,000 USD: http://battlehack.org/
[Small axe]
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Pozdr
rysiek